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Priscilla Alderson, Katy Sutcliffe and Katherine Curtis 
 
Elements of informed and voluntary consent and their relevance to children are 
reviewed with examples from research with children aged 3 to 12 years who 
have insulin dependent diabetes.   
 
    
Meanings of consent 
 
This paper reviews elements of consent that may be used as criteria to assess 
the competence of the person asked to give or withhold consent. The criteria are 
illustrated with selected examples from research with children who have insulin 
dependent (juvenile or type I) diabetes.1 The purpose of this paper is to consider 
whether children can fulfill agreed criteria of competent decision-making, set by 
the Declaration of Helsinki and the Nuremberg Code2 for medical research, but 
also relevant to medical treatment: informed consent based on understanding the 
nature and purpose of the intervention, the likely effects and any alternatives; 
sufficient comprehension to be able to make and signify an understanding and 
enlightened decision; voluntary consent as free power of choice, with the 
autonomy that includes the courage and resolve to stick to the decision whatever 
the outcome; legal capacity to give consent. The paper concludes by discussing 
the relevance of children’s competence and consent to twenty-first century health 
care and ethics.    
  Consent is usually considered in relation to surgery or medical research, 
although Anglo-American law expects consent to be elicited before any touching 
of the patient. One study found that some children in hospital were most upset by 
having their nametag fastened round their wrist.3 Such minor routines for 
practitioners may be major issues for patients, and one aspect of respect for 
consent is practitioners’ sensitivity to patients’ varying views and values. Type I 
diabetes involves numerous daily decisions by children about whether to resist or 
comply with their prescribed diet, injections and blood tests. Our research 
examined how these “minor” decisions relate to informed and voluntary consent.  
  An earlier study of 120 children aged 8-15 years having, on average, their fourth 
elective operation showed that the adults caring for them respected the informed 
decisions about major surgery made by some children aged from 7 years.4 
Instead of age or ability, the research found that experience is the salient factor 
in the children’s intellectual and moral competence. A craniofacial surgeon 
considers that “most” children can actively participate in major surgery decision-
making at about 8 years.5 Diabetes, however, involves decisions that are both 
harder and easier than decisions about surgery. Although often complex, surgery 
decisions can usually be specific, fairly clearly explained, and the fear, pain and 
disruption of surgery are time-limited even if the effects are not. In contrast, the 
diagnosis and prescriptions for type I diabetes expect the person to make a 
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continuing, life-long commitment, a practical consent associated with profound, 
existential, partly non-specific and unknown changes in personal identity and 
daily life.  
 
 
Developmental versus social research 
 
These children’s decisions about diet are made in a social context and at the 
intersections between simple mundane choices and starkly life-threatening risks, 
everyday versus complex endocrinological knowledge, and their peers’ versus 
their health practitioners’ conceptions of the good life. Daily management of 
diabetes mellitus (Latin for honey) illuminates exceptionally clearly children’s 
intellectual, moral and social competencies, because it is about controlling sugar, 
a key currency and symbol of childhood. In many cultures, confectionery is used 
to signify affection and popularity, inclusion or exclusion, to mark passing time 
(birthday cakes), celebrate festivals (Easter eggs and other sweets), reward, 
bribe, barter or (by withdrawal) threaten and punish children. Against this 
dominant sugar economy, children with diabetes have to avoid sugar, and to 
cope skillfully with being different from their friends without losing friendship and 
respect.  
  Philosophy, however abstract and analytical it is, can only be as sound as the 
social evidence and theories on which it relies. Bioethics is still dominated by 
outdated Piagetian child development age-stage theories of children’s ignorance, 
inexperience, and inability to make truly informed autonomous decisions,6 as if 
the mind and conscience grow as slowly as the body. The recent Hastings 
Center review on consent, for instance, excluded examples of people aged 
under-18 years.7 If children are pre-rational and pre-moral, like animals or 
machines, their views can hardly be informed or trust-worthy, and their 
responses would be either mindless compliance or irrational resistance. Locke 
and Kant denied that children and women could attain the rationality and 
independence necessary for autonomy.8  
  Traditional developmental psychological research uses methods that are liable 
to intimidate children and it thereby can underestimate their actual abilities and 
appear to confirm developmental theories.9 The methods that can be off-putting 
include standardized questionnaires with representative (healthy) groups, testing 
of hypotheses, use of “laboratory conditions”, “objective” observations and 
assessments of children’s responses without considering their own reasoning 
and explanations.  
  In contrast, the fairly rare examples of qualitative social research with children 
who have chronic illness or disability reveal far higher levels of knowledge and 
competence relating to their condition.10 These studies use: observations and 
interactions with children in the context of their everyday lives; examining topics 
in which the children are expert; semi-structured narrative interviews; use of toys, 
drawings and other non-verbal media; avoidance of normative tests and 
judgments; efforts to establish friendly rapport with children, and to understand 
their perspectives and reasoning.11 The newer social research is also informed 
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by cogent critiques of child development theory,12 and investigates  how 
children’s competencies are recognized or denied, encouraged or inhibited.            
  Taking these social research approaches, the “children as partners in their 
diabetes care” project1 investigated children’s views about their diabetes, their 
share in managing their care, and their everyday likes and dislikes, achievements 
and problems. We observed diabetes clinics in three English hospitals, two in 
inner city, multi-ethnic, disadvantaged areas, and one in a commuter town. With 
their consent, we held semi-structured tape-recorded interviews with 24 children 
aged 3-12 years and 29 of their parents (usually with their child), 2 pediatricians 
and 2 diabetes nurses. The mean age at interview was 8.7 years, and at 
diagnosis was 6.0 years (see table 1). Fifteen of the families in a purposive 
(deliberately diverse) sample were contacted by post with information leaflets 
and requests to opt into the research, and they were interviewed at home. Nine 
families in a convenience sample were contacted and interviewed in a diabetes 
clinic. Some children drew pictures. The children chose their research names to 
protect their anonymity.  
  Open questions were asked to encourage detailed narrative responses, for 
example, ‘What was the best day during your last holidays?’ The interview 
transcripts were systematically read and re-read, and analysed for themes raised 
by the interviewees,13 such as their views on normality, and for their direct and 
indirect replies throughout the session to the main research question: ‘When do 
children begin to be able and willing to take an active part in managing their 
diabetes care?’ The replies are analyzed in this paper to examine whether some 
of the children could meet the criteria for informed and voluntary consent. 




Informed consent – understanding the intervention’s nature, purpose, 
methods, means and duration 
 
The main purpose of insulin treatment, at least twice daily, for type I diabetes is 
to prevent too high (hyper) or too low (hypo) blood sugar levels (glycaemia) when 
the pancreas no longer secretes insulin.  Too high a dose could induce a hypo, a 
coma and in rare cases death. Too low an insulin dose and consistently high 
glycaemia result in feeling unwell with very serious longer-term morbidity 
(amputation, blindness, renal problems) and early mortality, problems suffered by 
one third to one half of British adults who have diabetes.14 
 
David (11): It’s an illness and an organ in your body isn’t working, 
and it’s stopped producing this liquid, and you need this liquid to turn 
sugar into energy, and this liquid is insulin, and so you have to have 
injections of it. And you can’t have so much sugar in your food. 
 
The children’s embodied knowledge of hypers and hypos  enables them to 
understand the “nature and purpose” of their treatment. They talked of being faint 
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and hungry, turning white or blue with hypos. Simba (7) was asked why insulin is 
important. 
 
Simba:      Cos you’re diabetic. If you don’t take it, I can die. 
Int:       Really? 
Simba:      And if I have a hypo I can die.  
Int:       And what’s a hypo? 
Simba:      Cos when I don’t eat all my food, I go to bed. And in middle 
of the night I start feeling shaky…   
Int:       And what do you do then? 
Simba:     I say, “Help!” …  Yeah…cos I thought I was getting sucked 
down a hole.  [Mum gives me] Hypo stop, sort of jelly thing …   
 
 While her mother described hypos, Maisie (3) showed the researcher how hypos 
make her feel “wobbly”, by shaking her arms. Having been ill with hypers, 
exhausted, white and thin for months before the diagnosis, Nicola (when aged 4) 
intensely understood her explanation, that insulin is the “key that turns sugar into 
energy”. Some children were so ill when they were diagnosed, they required 
intensive care. At times, some lost consciousness with hypos and were rushed to 
hospital and they vividly recalled these occasions. Their formal endocrinology 
may have been rudimentary, but they knew their treatment was life-sustaining.  
    
  All the children also understood the “methods and means” of daily treatment 
because they shared in performing these.  
 
Interviewer (showing a doll): This is my little girl. She’s just got 
diabetes and we don’t know what to do. Can you tell us what we 
need to do? 
Jessie (6): …when she’s feeling low you must always give her 
some sweets, and when she’s feeling high you must always, always 
not give her sweets, you must give her a sandwich or something. 
Int:    And how would I know if she’s high or low? 
Jessie:    She’ll tell you, I’m sure. 
Int: Is there anything else I need to do to look after myself? 
Jessie: Yes, you need to do your blood sugar and your leg, but 
I think your mummy will have to do the leg, and yourself to do your 
finger. Here’s your finger prick, and here’s your pen. 
Int: OK and what do I do with the finger prick? 
Jessie: There’s a little pricker inside, and you have to push the 
end, and there’s a little button and you have to twist it, and then you 
have to press it and it makes a hole in you, and then you have to 
squeeze out blood, and then put it on the special tab, and put it into 
the machine, and then you have to see how high or low you are so 
you can have some treats or not. So that’s how you do it. 
 
 5 
Some younger children performed their blood tests and injections, such as Nicola 
(from 4) and DJ (6), whereas some older ones  preferred to rely on their mother. 
Children also explained how they measured their blood sugar levels, and 
gradually learned to assess their carbohydrate intake, adapt their diet, and meet 
their changing needs (see reference 1 for details).   
  “Duration” can refer to the pace and timing of treatment. Through daily cycles, 
the children came to understand, plan and manage their constantly recurring 
needs for snacks, meals and insulin. “Duration” also refers to the lifelong nature 
of the condition. At any age it can be hard to prepare for 10 or 30, years ahead, 
so that this is not simply a limitation of childhood. The children indicated some 
understanding of permanence, in their practical acceptance in adapting of their 
lives to cope with diabetes. Some spoke of always having diabetes. John 
diagnosed when aged 10 said during his first blood test “they just pricked it…and 
I thought, ‘Oh God I’ll have to do this for the rest of my life’.” The children did not 
talk or behave as if they expected an end and a cure, however much they may 
have longed for that.  
 
 
Informed consent - anticipated benefits, potential hazards, inconveniences 
and discomfort 
 
However benign and well intentioned the caring adults, children suffer unless 
they can sense and trust in the adults’ benevolence. Human beings are meaning 
makers and even premature babies learn to anticipate when they will have a heel 
prick or a caress.15 It is logical for young children to believe that the treatment 
(needles, withheld sweets, pain and frustration) is worse than the disease, and 
therefore unless they are very clearly informed and reassured, children risk 
experiencing a form of the “torture”, which consent is designed to prevent. In its 
extreme form, torture involves “breaking down a person’s sense of identity” 
through inducing an utter sense of helplessness, unpredictability and confusion.16 
Children need to have some faith that the benefits of treatment outweigh the 
hazards, inconveniences and pain, and at first this could be very hard. “It hurt so 
much and I had no idea what was wrong with me and what they were doing,” 
David (11, diagnosed aged 8). As already mentioned, children who were 
extremely ill before diagnosis were better able to understand cost-benefit 
equations that justified their life-saving  treatment. Moogum, diagnosed when she 
was aged 5 years, said, “My sister was at home in bed and she was crying 
because she thought I was dead.”  Guy, diagnosed just after his sixth birthday, 
remembered being frightened alone in a hospital room and on a drip. “There was 
nobody, no one to talk to, there was no little boys…I was almost dead.” One 
mother and Alex (11) who both had severe needle phobia experienced fear and 
horror, although Alex remembered, “I was about 5. Yeah it was really tough on 
me…but I gradually got on alright,” with explanations, support and, at 10 years, 
wanting to become independent enough to go on a school journey. Children 
tended to say “inconveniences”, their irritation and boredom with disruptive 




Informed consent - effects on health or person, alternatives 
 
Consent is often assumed to concern an active practitioner’s intervention on to 
an individual passive patient. However, the management of chronic conditions 
involves numerous interventions, medically advised but often performed by the 
patient, from taking medication or exercise to dieting. To follow the diabetes 
medical regimen conscientiously demands persistence, ingenuity and will power, 
which depend on the person deeply understanding the wanted and unwanted 
effects of the condition and treatment on their “health or person”.   
  The interviews began with the children talking about what they liked and 
enjoyed. They had varied interests, diabetes was not necessarily a topic of great 
interest or importance to them, and they repeatedly said, “I just want to get on 
with my life,” and have a “normal” time with friends.17 The children aimed to fit in 
diabetes care around their daily activities, and a main reported problem was 
when adults obstructed this aim: teachers who singled out children as different, 
or made them miss playtime to stay in to have the snack, or refused to allow 
them to join school trips, and a friend’s mother who would not allow one girl to 
join in sleepovers at her house. One boy left an unfriendly school and was happy 
at his new school, another (small) school rearranged snack times so that 
everyone fitted in with Johnny’s needs. For the children,  “alternatives” included 
ways to make the diabetes care quicker, easier, less obtrusive and painful - or 
the reverse. For example, several  children said that they found using needles 
themselves less painful than when adults injected them.   
  The children were asked what they would tell a newly diagnosed child of their 
age about diabetes, and they tended to emphasize support, reassurance, and 
concern for the child’s feelings. Mr Football (9) ‘Try to accept it as quickly as 
possible. [pause]…  After a while it does get better because after a while you just 
get used to having injections, and after a while they don’t hurt as much.’ David 
(11) illustrated the complicated balancing of information and values, aspirations 
and sense of identity as a “normal” person with unusual needs when making 
proportionate decisions. He had heard of “a kid who forgot her injections for a 
week and she died,” and he emphasized that he would tell a newly diagnosed 
boy “it’s quite difficult to remember your injections, and if you forget them you 
might die [but also] Try just to get on with your life.” David drew a picture of a 
cheerful looking boy next to a huge pen, with the caption in capitals, ’‘DON’T LET 
AN INSULIN PEN PLUS NEEDLE CHANGE YOUR LIFE. YOU’RE JUST THE 
SAME AS YOU WERE BEFORE.” 
  
 
Comprehension – weighing information to make an understanding and 
enlightened decision 
  
The children showed that they understood from around 4 years, the general 
principle of managing glycaemia levels and something of the complicated 
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weighing of detailed information. From the start their parents explained 
carbohydrates values of different foods and helped them to choose appropriate 
meals, packed lunches and snacks. Parties and other treats could be stressful 
times, when the children had to watch other people enjoying more sweet food 
than they could have. Ruby’s mother described how, when aged 4, Ruby did not 
protest at the time, if the nursery staff forgot that she was allowed one piece of 
cake on birthdays, but later asked her mother to remind the staff for next time. 
When she was 5 years, Ruby was trusted to do a blood test and work out at 
parties how many sweet things she could eat. When she was 4 years she had 
not joined in with a friend who found and ate almost a whole box of chocolates 
while no adults were near, as Ruby’s subsequent low blood test result showed.  
  Children learned to plan their carbohydrate intake based on their glycaemic 
level, insulin dose, planned activities and whether the insulin and the food were 
fast or slow release. In Britain most families are expected to try to fit the diet to 
the prescribed insulin dose in this way. A few parents and children used the more 
complicated but also more liberating method of adapting the insulin dose to suit 
the chosen diet. In countries where practitioners promote this latter more 
informed and autonomous approach, people achieve better glycaemic control,18 
and some of the older children showed that they could do this. David (11) 
described how he would increase his insulin dose at a party to be able to have 
extra treats. “If it was after [my insulin dose] I would tend to have two or three [a 
small amount of treats], if it was before I would have some and then I would give 
myself a couple of extra units. Jimbo’s (11) mother described his answer-phone 
message he left for her, which said, “I’m 20 [high] so I need some rapid [release 
insulin] but I don’t know…” adding that he was not sure if his mother would 
advise a dose of 2 or 3 “so I’m giving myself 2”. The high risk of an overdose 
illustrates the mutual informed trust parents and children have to develop 
because parents cannot always be present.   
  Weighing information and burdens versus benefits before reaching an informed 
decision involves complicated immediate and long-term considerations. Despite 
the adults’ caring support, diabetes decisions can be more difficult for children 
than for adults. Children’s moral agency may not be recognized, their 
complicated consent may be underestimated as compliance, their sometimes 
reasoned “refusal” may be dismissed as foolish resistance, such as if they 
occasionally decide that it is more important to join in their friends’ activities for 
their social health, than to comply strictly to the regimen for their physiological 
health. Adults frequently make such life style choices. While children may be 
blamed for poor glycaemic control, their costly success may be attributed to the 
caring adults. It is even harder to balance short and long term interests, today’s 
sweets against health in 20 years time, when adults are understandably loathe to 
tell children about the very serious morbidity and mortality risks of diabetes, but 
then blame children for being irresponsible. When type 2 diabetes, which follows 
unhealthy life-style, is mistakenly confused with type 1 diabetes, which often 
develops in slim, fit, active children, children may wrongly be blamed for their ill 
health by people who know little about diabetes, and this can further undermine 
respect for and trust in the children and their decisions.   
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     Adults can make any decision for themselves, but an “enlightened” decision 
made for or by children has demonstrably to serve the child’s welfare or best 
interests. Most of the interviewees showed how even young children could be 
informed, responsible and reliable. An exception was Edwina (12) who 
sometimes collapsed at school and had to be taken to hospital. She was 
unhappy at school and she illustrates how school children’s ability to make 
difficult choices to promote their health appears to be less age-related than 
support-related in how far the child feels that the responsible adults are working 
with and not against her, in her best interests. Edwina drew a face, one side 
smiling, the other side crying, with the caption “diabetes can be good, bad, happy 
and sad. It can be painful and not painful” suggesting ambiguity and difficulty for 
herself and those around her to adjust to her fairly new identity, she was 
diagnosed two years earlier. Enlightened decisions link to maturity, wisdom and 
discretion,19 and parents’ comments on their children’s maturity are given later.  
 
 
Signifying a decision 
 
Children can clearly express consent or refusal in their body language as well as 
by speaking or writing and by actively taking or resisting the medication or other 
prescription.  Even the youngest children signified their informed commitment to 
the diabetes regimen many times a day. If Maisie (3) feels hypo at night “she 
shouts and shouts”, said her mother, and Holly’s mother commented, “By the 
time she was 3 she knew when a hypo was coming on. She’d say, ‘Mummy, my 
mouth feels funny, my eyes feel funny’.”  
   
 
Autonomy, courage and resolve 
 
Besides the intellectual competence needed for informed consent, voluntary 
consent involves moral maturity and autonomy, emotions as well as reason, 
journeying from fear and rejection of proposed treatment, through doubt and 
uncertain weighing of the information, towards hope, trust and confidence in 
the treatment.20 The endless regimen could be very hard and painful with 
the “hated” routines. Alex (11) used to scream so much about injections that 
the neighbors talked about it. He spoke of being “down in the depths” 
sometimes, and believed that prior explanations were vital for children, so 
“they know what’s going to happen, so they know they’re going to get used 
it, and just gives them courage as to what’s going to happen.” Alex echoed 
a legal ruling from 1767 before the era of anesthesia, which acknowledged 
the surgical patient’s arduous emotional labor: “It is reasonable that a 
patient should be told about what is about to be done to him, that he may 
take courage and put himself into such a situation as to enable him to 
undergo the operation.”21 Resolution was needed at first to accept the 
diagnosis and new personal identity and life style, and some children 
constantly had to summon up resolve, as such by the 4 year old who 
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hovered the needle over her skin for some while before taking courage to 
insert it.  
  While acknowledging that no one would wish to have diabetes, we asked if 
anything positive could ever come from having it. Alex replied, “My attitude has 
got better,” and his father said, “I think he’s responsible beyond his years. I think 
he’s had to be. His teacher even said, ‘If you give him a job he’ll do it, and within 
a certain time’…he’s mature beyond his years.”  James’s mother said he is “a 
regular kid”, but “for 10 years old, it’s quite scary sometimes, how mature he can 
be [and] for a 7½ year old to overcome that at that age…” (when diagnosed). 
DJ’s mother commented: “I sometimes forget that he is only 6. He’s very 
responsible… Diabetes-wise he’s very gown up… I would trust him… but I 
wouldn’t trust them” - adult friends who might look after DJ but forget to supervise 
his diabetes care, which DJ would remember.   
  The courage to consent includes willingness to take responsibility for risky 
decisions without blaming others, despite subsequent problems. It has been 
argued that even if children are able to give consent it is unwise and unkind 
potentially to burden them with this kind of guilt and blame. Pediatricians used to 
argue similarly that it was unfair to ask parents to consent to major risky 
decisions for the same reason.21 Their health care is inevitably so much in the 
hands of children with diabetes, and they feel blame and guilt if, for example, 
they have too many hypers. In our small sample, the children who achieved the 
best control were those who were most informed and trusted to plan their care, 
and although the pattern of cause and effect here is not definite, the association 
is clear between adults’ trust and children’s confidence and responsibility.         
 
 
Voluntary consent, free power of choice, without force, fraud, deceit, 
duress, overreaching or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion 
 
The idealized notion of freely given consent has been criticized on several 
counts. It was originally conceived for “non-therapeutic” medical research22 not 
for beneficial medical treatment. No one is omnipotent or omniscient, indeed 
without numerous influences and partial constraints we would not have a range 
of options to choose from, or the values and experiences that inform our choices. 
Patients are inevitably constrained by their illness, their mortal needs, their 
limited knowledge of medical complexities, and the present limits of medical skill 
and knowledge (no great advances have been made in diabetes care since 
insulin treatment began around 80 years ago). The survival of patients of any age 
sometimes depends on their being encouraged or cajoled into complying with 
treatment, when respect for their autonomy mingles with protective care. Yet 
although there may be a grey middle ground where persuasion verges into 
deceit, threats or pressure, there are clear differences between duress and 
reasonably “free power of choice” when avoidable pressures are withheld.   
  Some authors have concentrated so much on the pressures that practitioners 
should refrain from exerting, that they propose: because of the “many confusing 
associations surrounding the term ‘voluntariness’ [it should be replaced by the 
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term] non-control that does not have the history and connotation that burdens 
[sic] the terms ‘freedom’, voluntariness’ and ‘independence’.”23 This view seems 
to attribute all agency to the practitioners and none to the patients, whereas “free 
power of choice” is control – by the patient who ultimately makes the  decision. 
Children have traditionally been assumed to lack the Kantian autonomy and will 
necessary for voluntary decision-making. However, this diabetes study and other 
research with children24 demonstrate that at least some young children can make 
and keep to informed, wise and brave decisions.  Their decisions are “voluntary” 
in the sense that they are continually being made and remade, with many 
occasions for choice.  Adults cannot always be in control, and undue adult 
compulsion risks evoking resistance.   
 
  
Legal capacity to give consent. 
 
 The final element of competent valid decisions is the legal status of the decision 
maker. In Britain, doctors have no age bar, and can accept legally valid consent 
from children who, in the doctor’s clinical judgment, are able to make informed 
and wise decisions in their best interests.19 25 The “age of consent” varies widely 
between countries, illustrating how an age or status based criterion for 
competence is contested. Competence may also be assessed on outcome and 
whether the assessor agrees with the decision or, more fairly, competence is 
assessed by process and whether the methods of making the decision seem 
justifiable. Although United States law does not accept minors’ consent, the 
concepts of “assent” and of “mature minors” enable doctors to respect the 
agreement or refusal of certain minors.26   
  It is argued that if children can only make decisions, which are perceived by the 
treating doctor to be ‘in their best interests’, this cannot count as consent. 
Consent entails respect for any decision that the person makes, including ones 
that others might regard as against the person’s interests. This is true of consent 
to, and refusal of, treatment for competent adults. However, by law, medical 
decisions for children have to be agreed to be in the child’s best interests. 
Parents’ decisions for their children are as much constrained by this law as 
children’s own decisions. Yet this is not taken to invalidate parents’ consent, and 
so there is no clear reason why it should invalidate children’s consent. All 
patients’ decisions and consent are partly limited, first to what doctors agree to 
provide, and second, to realistic feasible options. These can involve, for example, 
consenting to months of dreaded chemotherapy as the least harmful/most 
hopeful decision, although it is very different from the first but unrealistic 
preference for instant health. The reality of the constraint of consideration for the 
child’s best interests is seen when doctors take parents to court, if they believe 
the parents are deciding against the child’s interests. When the courts are asked 
to authorise the medical decision to give or withhold treatment, they too are 
subject to the same child’s best interests constraint. There are reports in the US, 
for example, of children being taken into care in order to ensure that they receive 
Ritalin, which the parents have refused to administer for diagnosed hyperactivity.    
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  It is also often argued that it is a tautology to imply that children who make wise 
decisions are competent, and if they are competent they make wise decisions. 





The “children as partners” study illustrates how the experience of chronic illness 
enables children to develop related understanding, skill and maturity. Children 
(and adults) with diabetes often have treats and temporarily suspend strict 
control and indeed healthy living standards generally. Yet the children showed 
that from around 4 years they understood the principles and recommended 
standards of controlling diabetes, they could make informed and wise decisions 
in their own best interests, and tried very hard to keep them, generally working 
with, not against, the caring adults. Although having understanding and skill, the 
children at times wanted their parents to make decisions, do their injections, or 
talk to the doctor for them.    
  We are cautious about generalizing from this small project, and do not expect 
healthy young children, or those with acute or emergency conditions, to 
demonstrate comparable understanding or maturity about managing a serious 
chronic condition. However, our findings are confirmed by other qualitative 
research about the decisions of children with long-term illness or disability, and 
adults’ respect for their competence. African, Asian and South American 
research projects demonstrate highly developed competencies among young 
children who are forced to live through adversity and fairly independently.27 
These suggest that advantaged, sheltered children in the richer societies have 
latent capacities that they need not develop or demonstrate, and that child 
development theories based on research with advantaged children have 
mistakenly concluded that young children do not, and therefore cannot and, 
perhaps, should not have such capacities. Diabetes provides a rare example of 
Western children having to cope with high risk and adversity. Whereas very large 
surveys are required to support generalizations, for instance, about the average 
4 year old’s capabilities, only a few examples are needed to show, as our 
research does, that at least some “ordinary” young children are well enough in 
advance of child development theories to pose serious challenges to these 
theories.  
  Developmental psychology, and bioethics with its priorities of respect and 
justice need to revise their widely held underestimations of experienced 
children’s capacities, in order to reflect the realities of children’s involvement in 
managing chronic conditions, and the respect that some parents and 
practitioners accord to them. This revision involves intellectual work and also the 
harder ethical and emotional task of rethinking deeply held ideologies, such as 
beliefs that adults are always right and must retain all control, or that even when 
older children make informed and reasonable decisions, parents should decide 
for them, in the interests of preventing discord and of sustaining harmony within 
the “intimate family”.28 During research interviews, children and parents 
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repeatedly showed an awareness, which suggests that they would regard the 
overruling by parents of children’s responsible health care decisions as a 
violation of parental responsibility and of loving family intimacy. The important 
question of unwise decisions by competent children that may have adverse 
consequences is beyond the scope of this paper and the examples given by our 
interviewees, although it has been discussed elsewhere.4 In concentrating on 
children’s responses, this paper has only indirectly reviewed parents’ vital 
protective and nurturing role of fostering children’s competence. The examples 
do, however, suggest that  effective adults’ protection includes supporting 
children in learning as early as possible how they can share in protect 
themselves from the severe harms of mismanaged diabetes.      
   This paper has followed the usual approach of assessing whether children are 
competent. Equally important is assessment of the concerned adults. Have they 
given sufficiently clear relevant information, and resolved confusions and 
misunderstandings? Do they respect the child’s reasonable views and decisions, 
values and reasoning? Are they willing sometimes to revise their views and to 
learn from the child?   
  Alice Dreger has vividly shown how parents and doctors do not always 
understand children’s values and best interests, especially when a child has a 
different anatomy and physiology.17 The person who is in the body and is the 
body can have unique insights that may be essential for informed decision 
making. Woven through daily diabetes decisions is an ethics that Arthur Frank29 
has described as Socratic, and which asks: “What is the good life? How can I 
attain it? What kind of person do I want to be? And what kind of community do I 
want to be a member of?” Frank contrasts this with the narrower defensive ethics 
(detailed disclosure of risks, costs and hoped-for benefits, to facilitate precisely 
informed choices and precautions), which is usually debated in the literature.  
  Rather than assuming that the more serious the disease and treatment, the less 
young children can or should be involved in making decisions, the reverse view 
may be more reasonable. Sustainable consent when managing diabetes involves 
continuous moral, emotional, embodied choices, so that it is vital to involve 
children as much as possible, helping them to feel reconciled to and willing to 
‘own’ decisions that fit as nearly as possible to the person they would like to be 
and the life they would prefer to have. With their parents, and when their parents 
are absent, children have to work out ways to reconcile restrictions on their life 
style with the diets and choices powerfully promoted by advertising and enjoyed 
by their friends. They have to find a way to tell their own story that can help them 
to feel contented rather than frustrated, coerced and unfulfilled. They can bring 
imagination, courage and humor to answering this Socratic challenge. 10 
  It is therefore important not to view consent simply as a one-off event involving 
a test of the child’s understanding or ignorance that may find incompetence, by 
making children feel confused, anxious or alienated. Instead the consent process 
can nurture and enlarge children’s understanding, trust and confidence, through 
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Table 1: Purposive sample of children.  
  
Boys  Girls  








12 10 12 10 
11 9 11 6 
11 8 11 4 
11 5 11 2 
11 4 7 5 
11 6 months 7 3 
10 7 7  3 
10 7 6 15 months 
10 4 5 15 months 
9 8 3 16 months 
7 4   
6 6   
6 15 months   




                                                 
1    K. Sutcliffe, P. Alderson and K. Curtis Children as Partners in their Diabetes Care, 
(London: SSRU, Institute of Education, University of London, 2004) (download from 
http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/ssru_docs/DiabetesReportFinal.pdf). 
2   Declaration of Helsinki (Fernay Voltaire: World Medical Association, 1964/2000); The 
Nuremberg Code (http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html, 1947). 
3    A. B. Hill, Biting off the Bracelet, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1979).   
4   P. Alderson, Children’s Consent to Surgery, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1993).  
5   J. Marsh, “To Cut or Not to Cut?,” in Surgically Shaping Children, ed. E Parens (New 
York: Georgetown University Press, 2005).  
6   A. Buchanan and D. Brock, Deciding for Others,  (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989); G. Melton, G, Koocher and M Saks eds, Children’s Competence to 
Consent, (New York: Plenum Press, 1983); W. Gaylin and R. Macklin, Who Speaks for 
the Child?, (New York: Plenum Press 1982); L. Kopelman and J. Moskop eds, Children 
and Health Care: Moral and Social Issues, (Dordecht: Kluwer, 1989). 
7   J. Sugarman, D. McCrory, D. Powell, A. Kransy, B. Adams, B. Ball and C. Cassell, 
Empirical research on informed consent (adults) Hastings Centre Report (New York: 
Hastings Center, 1999 29,1: supplement pp s1-42).  
8   S. Mendus, “Kant: an honest but narrow-minded bourgeois?,” in E. Kennedy and S. 
Mendus eds Women in Western Political Philosophy, (Brighton: Harvester, 1987), pp.1-
20. 
9   For example, the still widely cited T. Grisso and L. Vierling “Minors’ Consent to 
Treatment: a Developmental Perspective,” Professional Psychology 9 (1978):412-27. 
10   For example, M. Bluebond-Langner The Private Worlds of Dying Children. (Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); D. Bearison They Never Want to Tell You. 
London: Harvard University Press, 1991); P. Alderson and C. Goodey, Enabling 
Education, (London: Tufnell Press, 1998); C. D. Clark, In Sickness and In Play, (New 
Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003).  
11   P. Christensen and A. James eds, Research With Children, (London: Routledge 
Falmer, 2000).   
 16 
                                                                                                                                                 
12   B. Bradley, Visions of Infancy: a Critical Introduction to Child Psychology, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); J. Morss, Growing Critical: Alternatives to 
Developmental Psychology, (London: Routledge, 1996); E. Burman, Deconstructing 
Developmental Psychology, (London: Routledge, 1994); M. Donaldson Children's Minds, 
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1978); B. Mayall, Towards a Sociology for Childhood, (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 2002); A. James and A, Prout Constructing and Reconstructing 
Childhood, (London: Routledge Falmer, 1997). 
13   A. Strauss and J. Corbin Basics of Qualitative Research, (London: Sage, 1998). 
14   “Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Report”, New England Journal of 
Medicine, 329 (1993) 683-698; National Service Framework for Diabetes 
Standards, (London: Department of Health, 2001). 
15  H. Als, “Reading the premature infant,” in Developmental Interventions in the 
Neonatal Intensive Care Nursery, ed. E. Goldson (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999: 18-85).  
16   S. Melzak “Secrecy, Privacy, Survival, Repressive Regimes and Growing Up,” 
Bulletin of Ann Freud Centre, 15 (1992), pp. 205-24 .   
17   A. Dreger, One Of Us: Conjoined Twins and The Future of Normal, (Cambridge MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) shows the wide extent to which apparently abnormal 
people insist that they are normal, and see also note 10 above. 
18   H. Mortensen and P. Hougaard, “Comparison of Metabolic Control in a Cross 
Sectional Study of 2,873 Children and Adolescents with IDDM from 18 countries,” 
Diabetes Care, 20 (1997) 714-720. 
19   This is clearly described in the English case Gillick v. Wisbech & W. Norfolk AHA 
[1984] 1 All ER.  
20   P. Alderson, Choosing for Children: Parents’ Consent to Surgery, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
21   Slater v. Baker & Stapleton,1767/94 ER 60 (England). 
22   Nuremberg see ref. 2. 
23   R. Faden and T. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986) p. 257.  
24   See refs. 1, 4 and 10 above.  
25   Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act (1991), section 4 (2).  
 17 
                                                                                                                                                 
26   American Association of Pediatrics, “Informed Consent, Parental Permission and 
Assent in Pediatric Practice” (RE9510), Pediatrics, 95 (1995) 314-7; J. Rosato, The 
ethics of clinical trials. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 28: 362-8.  
27    M. Liebel, A Will of Their Own: Cross-cultural Perspectives on Working Children, 
(London: Zed Books, 2004). 
28   L. F. Ross, Children, Families, and Health Care Decision-Making. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998).    
29   A. Frank, “Emily’s Scars,” in E. Parens ed, Surgically Shaping Children, (New York: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005). 
